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RETHINKING PROSECUTION HISTORY ESTOPPEL
DOUGLAS LICHTMAN*
Under the rule of prosecution history estoppel, patent applicants who amend their claims
during the course of patent prosecution assume a significant risk: namely, the risk that a court
will later construe the changes as concessions that should be read to limit patent scope. This
risk is exacerbated by strong evidentiary presumptions under which courts are to assume,
unless the patentee presents sufficient evidence otherwise, that every change triggers estoppel,
and that the resulting estoppel forfeits everything except that which the revised language
literally describes. The justification for these presumptions is that, implemented in this fashion,
prosecution history estoppel makes patent scope more predictable. In this Article, I argue that
the benefit comes at too high a price. Drawing on a large empirical study of patent prosecution,
I show that, because of these evidentiary presumptions, estoppel is dangerously sensitive to
differences between patent examiners and differences across technology categories. That is,
estoppel treats similar applications in dissimilar ways, not because of differences on the merits,
but instead because of the personal characteristics of the examiners involved and because of
differences inherent to the types of technology at issue. A better rule, I argue, would minimize
the significance of examiner and technology disparities by reversing the current evidentiary
presumptions and thus recognizing estoppel only where there is clear evidence that the
applicant and the examiner intended to forfeit a given scope of coverage.

I. I N T R O D U C T I O N
Patent prosecution is an iterative process, and during that process patent
applicants often change the language of their proposed claims. A running debate
in patent law considers whether and how evidence of those language changes
should be used by courts to construe the resulting patent claims. On one view, the
meaning of a word can be distorted when taken out of context, and the best way to
put patent language into context is to study the history of the patent document. On
another view, evidence drawn from a patent’s prosecution history is cumbersome,
ambiguous, sometimes misleading and often incomplete, and the goals of the
patent system would therefore be better served were courts to ignore language
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changes and focus instead on the final claim language standing alone. The puzzle
bears an obvious resemblance to a perhaps more familiar question in statutory
interpretation; namely, the question of whether and how legislative history should
be used when construing the language of an enacted statute.
In the patent context, the debate has primarily played out in the shadow of the
doctrine of equivalents. The doctrine of equivalents empowers courts to construe
patent claims to cover not only that which they literally describe, but also some
range of equivalent subject matter that technically falls outside the literal claim
language but on policy grounds seems appropriately considered part of the patent
holder’s exclusive domain. The doctrine is typically invoked in instances where
unscrupulous competitors would otherwise be able to undermine the patent grant
by exploiting loopholes in the literal claim language.1 Loopholes eligible for this
sort of protection include loopholes caused by the unavoidable imprecision of
language,2 loopholes caused by events and circumstances that were not reasonably
foreseeable at the time the literal claim language was drafted,3 and loopholes
where the accused invention is an insubstantial variant of the invention literally
described.4 As these examples make plain, a major drawback to equivalents
analysis is that it renders uncertain the precise boundaries of any particular patent
claim. One mechanism used to address that worry—and the primary means
through which the history of the patent document influences claim
interpretation—is the rule of prosecution history estoppel.5

1

As the Supreme Court explained in Graver Tank, the “essence of the doctrine is that one
may not practice fraud on a patent” by making “unimportant and insubstantial changes” that,
“though adding nothing, would be enough to take the copied matter outside” the scope of the
literal claims. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co, 339 U.S. 605, 607-08 (1950).
2

See, e.g., id. at 607 (without equivalents, patentee would be “at the mercy of verbalism”);
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (“Festo VIII”), 535 U.S. 722, 734
(“equivalents is premised on language's inability to capture the essence of innovation”).
3

See, e.g., Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 938 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(en banc), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1226 (1988) (“the facts here do not involve later-developed
computer technology which should be deemed within the scope of the claims to avoid the
pirating of an invention”).
4

See, e.g., Carman Industries v. Wahl, 724 F.2d 932, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (equivalents
analysis appropriate where accused infringer seeks “to appropriate the invention with minor
modification to avoid the literal language of the claims”).
5

There are other doctrines in patent law explicitly designed to reduce the uncertainty
created by the doctrine of equivalents. For discussion, see Adelman et. al, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 798-841 (2d ed. 2003).

2
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Prosecution history estoppel applies where a patent applicant narrows a patent
claim during patent prosecution in order “to avoid prior art, or otherwise to
address a specific concern ... that arguably would have rendered the claimed
subject matter unpatentable.”6 In these instances, estoppel bars the applicant from
later using the doctrine of equivalents to recapture the lost ground. As the
Supreme Court put it in Schriber-Schroth—and note how the Court’s explanation
sounds in classic estoppel and waiver terms—an applicant “may not, by resort to
the doctrine of equivalents, give to an allowed claim [the] scope which it might
have had without the [narrowing] amendments.”7 By amending the claim, the
applicant is deemed to have “recognized and emphasized the difference between
the two phrases and proclaimed his abandonment of all that is embraced in that
difference.”8
In order for estoppel to achieve its purpose of reducing the uncertainty
inherent in equivalents analysis,9 estoppel itself must be implemented in a
predictable fashion. Courts have therefore built into the rule heavy evidentiary
presumptions. For example, although as a technical matter prosecution history
estoppel only applies where a narrowing amendment was made to satisfy a
requirement of the Patent Act—and note how broad a category that already is—
the Supreme Court held in Warner-Jenkenson that the patent holder bears the
burden of establishing the reason for any narrowing amendment, and, where no
explanation can be established, courts are to presume that estoppel applies.10 This
has proven to be a difficult presumption for patent holders to overcome given that,
historically, neither patent examiners nor patent applicants have put much effort

6

Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 30-31 (1997); accord
Festo VIII, supra note _, at 735. While all the major cases focus on claim language
amendments, an applicant can trigger estoppel in other ways. For example, the act of deleting a
claim of broader scope than those ultimately allowed certainly carries with it implicit
representations that can later be held against the applicant. Indeed, mere arguments can also
give rise to estoppel, even if unaccompanied by any language changes.
7

Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 311 U.S. 211, 221 (1940).

8

Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 136 (1942).

9

Although this is the theory on which the courts routinely focus, estoppel does arguably
serve other purposes. See Part V.
10

Warner-Jenkinson, supra note _, at 33. It is unclear what presumption, if any, is applied
in answering the threshold question of whether a given amendment narrows or broadens a
claim. That is, there are two preliminary questions to ask with respect to estoppel: the first
considers whether the change narrowed or expanded claim scope, and the second—which
applies only to narrowing amendments—asks whether the narrowing was done to satisfy a
requirement of the Patent Act. The Supreme Court has yet to rule on the proper presumption to
apply in the first of these two inquiries, and the Federal Circuit apparently views that as an
open question as well. See Festo IX, cited in note *, at _.
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into documenting the reasons for patent claim amendments.11 Moreover, the
presumption sticks even if it turns out that the amendment at issue was not in fact
necessary to preserve patent validity. For instance, if the examiner incorrectly
interprets the prior art and, because of that error, the applicant agrees to narrow a
given claim, the applicant is still bound by the concession.12 Thus, in practice, the
only evidence that immunizes a patentee is clear evidence that a given narrowing
amendment was not made with the intent to preserve claim validity; evidence that
the change was not necessary to satisfy Patent Act requirements is not enough.13
Similarly, once estoppel is found to apply, courts must determine the scope of
the resulting estoppel, and here again there is today in place a strong evidentiary
presumption, albeit a presumption that is weaker than that recently proposed by
the Federal Circuit.14 Specifically, under the Supreme Court’s Festo decision, the
patentee bears the burden of showing that the amendment “cannot reasonably be
viewed as surrendering [the] particular equivalent” at issue.15 The patentee can
carry this burden by showing that the equivalent was unforeseeable at the time of
the claim amendment,16 or that the “rationale underlying the amendment [bore] no
more than a tangential relation to the equivalent in question.”17 But where the
applicant cannot make these or similar showings—and, again, this is likely to be a
common case given how poorly the process of patent prosecution is documented
under current Patent Office practices18—the doctrine of equivalents is in essence
repealed and the applicant must rely on literal claim coverage alone.

11

For a rich discussion of current practice, see John Thomas, On Preparatory Texts and
Proprietary Technologies: The Place of Prosecution Histories in Patent Claim Interpretation, 47
UCLA L Rev 183, 188-91, 203 (2000).
12

See Exhibit Supply, supra note _, at 137. Of course, the applicant can resist the examiner
and ultimately appeal the dispute to higher officials at the Patent Office. See notes _.
13

The evidence also must come from documents on file at the Patent Office, rather than
from documents in the patentee’s private possession. See Festo IX, cited note *, at _. Any other
rule would make it difficult for rivals to determine patent scope prior to litigation, thus
undermining predictability.
14

See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (“Festo VI”), 234 F.3d 558,
564 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding, prior to Supreme Court reversal, that “when a claim amendment
creates [estoppel], no range of equivalents is available for the amended claim element”).
15

See Festo VIII, supra note _, at 740.

16

Id.

17

Id.

18

See supra note _; cf. Festo VI, supra note _, at _575 (describing context-sensitive
estoppel as “unworkable” and thus advocating a bright-line rule). Of course, all this might

4
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In this Article, I raise two concerns over the practical implications of the
modern estoppel rule. The first is based on an empirical finding that there are
statistically significant differences between patent examiners in terms of their
tendency to require that patent applicants alter claim language. That is, while some
examiners routinely require significant language alterations, others regularly leave
the original claim language largely intact. These differences are of substantial
magnitude and they persist even after controlling for factors like the type of
technology involved and the length of the original application. They are troubling
because they cause the burdens of prosecution history estoppel to be distributed in
an arbitrary fashion. If an applicant happens to be assigned to an examiner who
tends to require few language alterations, estoppel is not much of a risk. If an
applicant happens to be assigned an examiner who tends to demand a large
number of language alterations, by contrast, the threat of estoppel looms large.
From the perspective of the patent applicant, this difference is a random effect,
unrelated to the merits, that forces unlucky applicants either to suffer the harms
associated with estoppel, or to spend additional resources during patent
prosecution resisting the examiner and documenting with care any amendments
ultimately made. From a policy perspective, meanwhile, these examiner disparities
mean that using prosecution history estoppel to reduce the uncertainty associated
with equivalents analysis has a large and unanticipated cost: it makes the patent
system more random, specifically by linking patent scope to what turns out to be a
personal characteristic that varies considerably from one patent examiner to
another.19
My second concern derives from a related empirical finding: that there are also
statistically significant differences across technology categories in terms of the
extent to which claim language is changed during the average patent prosecution.
Claim language describing a patentable advance in nanotechnology, for example,
is on average altered much more significantly than is claim language describing a
patentable advance related to automobile engines or electrical lighting. It is not
entirely clear what drives these differences. But if it is right to assume that
language adjustments are more common in complicated and rapidly evolving
technologies—technologies where it is more difficult for applicants to write
appropriate claims in the first instance, and technologies where there is more room
for reasonable disagreement between applicant and examiner at the time of patent
prosecution—then estoppel threatens the doctrine of equivalents in the very cases

change now that estoppel is such a harsh rule, although such a change would be costly given
the large number of applications filed with the Patent Office each year.
19

Note that examiners rarely directly propose claim language. Instead, an examiner
influences claim language indirectly by refusing to accept a literal claim until the claim is
worded in what the examiner deems to be an acceptable manner.
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where equivalents analysis is needed most: instances where conscientious
applicants working with qualified examiners might still fail to capture in literal
terms the proper boundaries of the invention at hand.
These concerns can be addressed. Were the aforementioned evidentiary
presumptions reversed, for example, prosecution history estoppel would be
triggered less often, and, at that, only in situations where the applicant and
examiner actually meant to foreclose a given equivalent. This would reduce the
legal risk associated with amendments to claim language, and it would therefore
reduce the importance of differences between examiners and across technology
categories. Another approach would have the Patent Office take more seriously its
role in documenting the process of patent prosecution. This might be expensive,
but it, too, would help ensure that estoppel would be triggered only in situations
where the applicant and examiner actually meant to foreclose a given equivalent,
again rendering estoppel less sensitive to examiner and technology disparities. At
the same time, new mechanisms could be introduced to take the place of estoppel
in terms of reducing the uncertainty created by the doctrine of equivalents.
Naturally, there is much more to say on all these points. I proceed as follows.
In Part II, I introduce the basic methodology behind my empirical work,
explaining the data set and identifying strengths and weaknesses in my approach.
In Part III, I present my core statistical analysis. I show that the identity of the
examiner drives the extent of claim language alteration, and I show that claim
language alterations also differ significantly from technology to technology. In
Part IV, I discuss the implications of these technology and examiner disparities,
developing in further detail the challenges they raise for the rule of prosecution
history estoppel and, through that rule, for the doctrine of equivalents as well. In
Part V, I briefly conclude.
II. M E T H O D O L O G Y
In November 2000, the United States Patent and Trademark Office initiated a
program under which newly filed patent applications are made public “after the
expiration of a period of 18 months from the earliest filing date for which a benefit
is sought.”20 Not all applications are published under this new program. For
instance, an application is not published if it is abandoned during that eighteen
month period,21 and an application is not published if the applicant asserts a

20

35 U.S.C. §122(b). The program operates under the authority of the American Inventors
Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501A-552 (1999). The core provisions
are codified at 35 U.S.C. §122(b).
21

Id. §122(b)(2)(A)(i).
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special exemption that maintains confidentiality for patent applications that have
been filed in the United States but have not been filed in a foreign country that
itself requires disclosure after eighteen months.22 Nevertheless, in under three
years of operation, the program has already generated a public archive of more
than 400,000 patent applications, and new applications are today being added at
the rate of approximately 20,000 per month.
In January 2003, I collected the 300,000 applications then available, and I
traced each through its time at the Patent Office. The idea was to identify
applications for which I could take a single issued patent, compare that patent to
the single application in hand, and in that way detect any changes that were made
during the process of patent review. This approach saves the expense and labor
associated with gathering such information directly from the records kept at the
Patent Office, making practicable an empirical study that otherwise would have
been cost-prohibitive.23 To identify the appropriate applications, I obviously
needed to exclude applications that were still under review, because for those there
was no issued patent against which to compare the application; and I also needed
to exclude applications that either had splintered into multiple related patents, or
had the potential to so splinter, because in those instances the proper interpretation

22

Id. §122(b)(2)(B)(i). The applicant must also certify that the invention will not be
subject to such an application in the future.
23

The paperwork generated during patent prosecution—the “file wrapper”—is in theory
available to the public after a patent issues, but acquiring this paperwork from the Patent
Office is expensive, and files have traditionally been available only in paper form. See 37
C.F.R. §1.19 (fee schedule).
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of any application/patent pair would have been ambiguous.24 This filtering process
left me with just under 20,000 workable applications.25
Building the data set in this manner of course introduced some biases. For
example, the data set does not include any patent applications for which patent
prosecution took fewer than eighteen months, because patent applications are
published under the new regulations only after eighteen months have passed. The
data set likewise excludes patent applications that were abandoned by the
applicant, and applications that were denied by the examiner, because the
comparison strategy only works for applications that actually led to issued patents.
The data set also excludes any application that qualified for the special exemption
mentioned above, and any application that was splintered either voluntarily or at
the direction of a patent examiner. However, none of these exclusions is
particularly troubling for current purposes, because each primarily biases the data
against what turned out to be my primary findings. That is, each of these
exclusions reduces diversity in the data set, making it all the more surprising that I
found statistically significant differences between examiners and across
technology categories.

24

A patent application can split into multiple related applications either by the filing of a
divisional application, which literally takes material first included in the original application
and divides it into two or more separate applications, or by the filing of a continuation-in-part,
which draws material from the original application but in addition introduces new material.
Both variants complicate the otherwise-intuitive comparison approach, and ultimately I
decided that it was better to exclude such applications rather than introduce error by attempting
to incorporate them.
Note that I also excluded continuation applications. A continuation application is an
application submitted some time after patent prosecution has begun. It revises its associated
original application and is separately identified primarily as a way of collecting higher fees
from applicants who make large numbers of changes. I excluded continuations because the
baseline of interest is the application as it was first submitted, not the application as it appeared
after some interaction with the relevant examiner. Even where I excluded a continuation
application, however, I included the original application that led to that continuation, so long as
the original application otherwise qualified.
25

It is possible that some small number of these applications should have been excluded
because, as late as one month before an application is published, the Patent Office allows an
applicant to swap his original application for a more updated version. See 35 C.F.R. §1.215(c).
Swapped applications are not distinguished from other applications when published; the only
way to detect them is to consult the relevant file wrappers. They are problematic for this
project because the baseline of interest is the application as it was first submitted, not the
application as it appeared after some interaction with the relevant examiner. That said,
unpublished Patent Office statistics suggest that fewer than 100 applicants take advantage of
this regulation each year, which means that at most a negligible percentage of my applications
were affected. See email from Deputy Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy Stephen
Kunin (January 25, 2003) (on file with author).
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A. Examiner Disparities
To answer the question about examiner disparities, I needed to draw from each
application/patent pair three basic types of information. The first type of
information was simply the name of the examiner or examiners who actually
reviewed each application in the data set. This was easy information to acquire,
given that examiners are identified by name on the patents they allow. Indeed, the
only judgment call that had to be made with respect to this information was a
decision regarding how to code patents where two examiners—an inexperienced
“assistant examiner” working under a more experienced “primary examiner”—
together reviewed the same application. I decided that the best approach was to
treat each unique team as a separate entity, the logic being that, from the
perspective of a patent applicant, an evaluation conducted by examiners Smith and
Jones is meaningfully different from an evaluation conducted by examiners Smith
and Williams, even though both pairs include examiner Smith. In the database, I
therefore gave each unique team, and each individual examiner, a distinct
identifier.
The second type of information that I needed to extract was some measure of
the extent to which a given application’s claim language changed during the
course of patent prosecution. To that end, I decided to count (1) the number of
unique words used in the issued claims but not used in the original claims; and (2)
the number of unique words used in the original claims but not used in the issued
claims. That is, I made a list of the vocabulary used to describe the invention in
the application claims, and I made a list of the vocabulary used to describe the
invention in the patent claims; I then compared the two lists, counting any word
that was present on one list but missing from the other. The intuition is that every
time an applicant either introduces a new vocabulary word or removes an existing
vocabulary word, he assumes the risk that a court will later construe the change as
a concession. The number of vocabulary changes is therefore a rough proxy for
estoppel risk.26

26

Admittedly, there are limitations to this approach. For example, it accidentally counts
typographical errors that are present in the application but corrected in the issued patent, even
though those carry with them little estoppel risk. It also counts language changes in instances
where the applicant has other claims that cover the same subject matter and, hence, there is a
plausible argument that the changes should not be read to forfeit any ground. Moreover, this
approach necessarily fails to detect any estoppel not associated with language changes, such as
an estoppel that arises by virtue of an argument presented by the applicant during patent
prosecution. These and related limitations are admittedly important; but their implications
should not be overstated. After all, these factors affect every observation, and thus it is unlikely
that they significantly distort comparisons between examiners and across technology
categories.

9
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The third type of information I needed to gather was information that might
help to control for relevant differences between the applications. One obviously
important control was some measure of application length. I ultimately decided to
use for this purpose the number of different vocabulary words that were used in
the original application claims. This is one measure of length, and it correlates
strongly to other obvious measures like the number of words in the application
claims, the number of words in the application overall, and the number of claims
listed in the application. This count has an added virtue, however, in that it also
provides information about the complexity of the original application. The
intuition here is that applications with a high degree of vocabulary diversity are
likely harder to evaluate than applications where the number of distinct vocabulary
words is relatively low.27
A second obviously important control was information regarding the type of
technology described in each application. If an application claiming an advance in
nanotechnology naturally invites more language alteration than an otherwise
comparable application related to automobile bumpers—an outcome I confirm in

That said, I have run a number of robustness checks to look for these sorts of problems.
For example, in one run I coded not only the word counts referenced above, but also weighted
versions where the introduction or removal of a rare word counted more heavily than the
introduction or removal of a common one. I actually did this with considerable precision. I
gathered a sample of 10,000 issued patents and created a frequency table that showed in how
many of those patents any given word appeared. I then assigned scores based on the inverse of
the frequencies, such that the loss or addition of a common word like “the” or “said” was
scored close to zero, whereas the loss or addition of a rare word like “hand-activated” or
“vacant” was scored close to one. I ended up dropping these weighted vocabulary counts from
the analysis, however, because they turned out to be almost perfectly correlated with the
simpler unweighted tallies. Other robustness checks—for example, a run that counted only
those language changes that affected independent claims—similarly seemed to have little
effect on the ultimate results.
27

Another reason for using the number of vocabulary words rather than other intuitive
measures is that the other measures are each significantly distorted by the pyramid structure of
patent claiming. Patent claims are drafted such that broad “independent” claims stake out the
main contributions and then largely redundant “dependent” claims repeat the theme of each
broad claim but add additional narrowing information. Counting the number of claims
therefore poorly measures the length of an application, because this number is significantly
influenced by the number of dependent claims even though those are typically trivial to
evaluate once their related independent claims have been studied. Counting the number of
words used in the claims also poorly measures length, again because that number is unduly
sensitive to the number of dependent claims. Counting the number of independent claims is a
better option, but that tally ignores the fact that dependent claims do add new information that
must be reviewed, albeit less than would an additional independent claim. Counting the
number of distinct vocabulary words therefore seemed like the most reliable measure of
application length, in that it is not sensitive to repetition and yet it does account for any new
vocabulary introduced in dependent claims.

10
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this study—comparing examiners without simultaneously accounting for
technology introduces significant error into the analysis: an examiner who works
more often on automobile bumpers would seem less exacting than his
nanotechnology peer, no matter what the real differences between the two. The
difficult question was how best to capture this information. After all, every
successful application to some degree describes its own distinct technology, and
yet it is impossible to conduct statistical analysis in a situation where every
observation is treated as being part of a unique group.
In the patent literature, approaches vary, with some papers introducing
elaborate classification schemes that distinguish hundreds of technology
categories, while others settle for relatively course alternatives that lump all
technologies together under six or ten headings. Typically, the decision is driven
by two factors: the size of the data set under consideration, and the perceived
importance of technology characteristics to the research question at hand. I
ultimately decided to err on the side of caution and adopt a fine-grained approach.
Specifically, the Patent Office classifies issued patents according to a system that
distinguishes 421 technology types, and every issued patent is labeled with a
three-digit code that identifies the technology according to this classification
scheme. I lifted those codes from the patents in the data set, chose the ten classes
for which I had the most observations, and used those classes to study examiners
one technology at a time. The ten classes that I ended up using are listed in Figure
1.

Patent Class
438
365
257
439
123
327
359
361
347
701

Figure 1

Description
Semiconductor Device Manufacturing Process
Static Information Storage and Retrieval
Active Solid-State Devices
Electrical Connectors
Internal-Combustion Engines
Misc Active Electrical Nonlinear Devices, Circuits & Systems
Optics: Systems and Elements
Electricity: Electircal Systems & Devices
Incremental Printing of Symbolic Information
Data Processing: Vehicles, Navigation, and Relative Location

The ten patent classes studied in this research; descriptors are drawn
directly from the Patent Office classification chart.

When I first designed this project, I suspected that, in addition to controlling
for application length and technology, it would also be important to control for the
size and expertise of the law firm, if any, that prosecuted each application. This
might be important if, for example, the patent prosecution strategies adopted by
large firms differ from those adopted by patent boutiques in ways that affect claim
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language alteration. Law firms are typically identified by name on the patents they
prosecute, so I recorded law firm names whenever they were available, and then
matched those names to publicly available information about the number of
patents each firm prosecuted in the last five years, the approximate number of
licensed patent attorneys employed by each firm, and the average experience level
of the patent attorneys employed by each firm.28 In the end, I was able to add this
information to approximately two-thirds of the applications in the database; yet, to
my surprise, the results did not turn out to have much explanatory power. While
these variables were statistically significant in the context of an occasional patent
class, even there the effect was always several orders of magnitude smaller than
the effects attributed to the various examiner-specific variables. I therefore
decided to simplify my regressions—and, through that, expand the number of
statistical tools available for use with the data29—by dropping these controls.
More broadly, when I designed this project, I identified a large number of
additional controls that I imagined as possibly relevant, including some for which
the necessary information was readily available and others where the necessary
information would have been all but impossible to track down. For example, it
likely matters whether the person who actually drafted the patent application was
able to meet with the patent examiner in person, rather than interacting exclusively
through telephone calls and the exchange of written documents. It likely also
would be informative to know the number of prior art sources cited in each
application, because a long list might signal that the applicant was particularly
diligent in preparing the application, or that the application falls into a relatively
crowded art. It might be helpful to know the country where the claimed
technology was first developed or patented, because an application written
originally for another country’s patent system might differ substantially from one
originally drafted with Patent Office rules and regulations in mind. It might even
be helpful to know if there was a company involved in guiding the application, as
applications prosecuted on behalf of individual inventors surely differ from
applications where a for-profit corporation is paying the fees and calling the shots.

28

I counted the number of patents prosecuted by each firm myself, and I acquired the
information about the number of licensed attorneys and their experience from PatentRatings,
LLC, which in turn was able to get the information from records maintained and made public
by the Patent Office through its Office of Enrollment and Discipline.
29

The median test, which turned out to be the most reliable statistical tool by which to
confirm the existence of examiner-specific effects, is severely limited in the number of control
variables it can accommodate. Restricting the number of control variables thus turned out to be
an important objective in my data collection strategy.
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Rather than overwhelm the analysis with an unending list of considerations,
however, I decided instead to restrict the study to include only those examiners for
whom I had ten or more observations. The logic is that, within a given technology
class, most other factors are randomly distributed across applications, such that,
over the course of a large enough sample, every examiner working within a
particular technology class will face approximately the same number of
applications originally drafted for a foreign country, approximately the same
number of applications where the applicant requests in-person negotiations, and so
on. If true, these factors can be safely ignored, as they will not distort comparisons
from one examiner to another.30
Patent Class Examiners Observations
438
11
157
365
17
451
257
11
140
439
12
250
123
16
334
327
15
244
359
12
187
361
8
144
347
10
173
701
10
202

Figure 2

The data set, described by patent class, including only those
examiners with 10 or more observations.

Figure 2 describes the resulting data. The first column identifies the relevant
patent class, the second column reports the number of examiners working in that
class who processed 10 or more applications during the timeframe of interest, and
the third column counts the total number of applications processed by those

30

Of course, I would be even more comfortable with this assumption were I able to set the
minimum threshold at twenty or thirty observations, rather than ten. However, two factors
cautioned against such an adjustment. First, the higher the threshold, the more data excluded
from the analysis. That is a serious cost in this study given that I started out with only
approximately 20,000 patent applications representing nearly 400 patent classes and nearly
3,000 patent examiners. Second, excluding examiners with small numbers of observations
biases the data against a finding of examiner diversity. The reason is that a minimum threshold
excludes examiners who work slowly and thus were not able to process the requisite number of
applications during the timeframe under consideration, and it also excludes examiners who
work quickly and thus processed more than the requisite number but did not have enough that
lasted the eighteen months required to trigger mandatory publication. The higher the threshold,
the greater these distortions. Thus, I was reluctant to choose too high a threshold, especially
given that most of the missing controls are likely of trivial import as compared to the
technology, length, and complexity factors that I explicitly account for in the regressions.
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examiners. This is the data that I used to answer the question about examiner
disparities.
B. Technology Disparities
With the preceding information already gathered, no additional information
was required to study differences across technologies. The only adjustment I made
was to replace the 421-category technology classification system with a 36category alternative developed by the National Bureau of Economic Affairs.31 The
rationale for the change is purely cosmetic: the 36-category approach uses
classifications that might be more intuitive for the lay reader. The categories, and
the number of observations per category, are listed in Figure 3.
Category
Chemical
Chemical
Chemical
Chemical
Chemical
Chemical
Computers/Comm
Computers/Comm
Computers/Comm
Computers/Comm
Drugs/Medical
Drugs/Medical
Drugs/Medical
Drugs/Medical
Electrical/Electronic
Electrical/Electronic
Electrical/Electronic
Electrical/Electronic
Electrical/Electronic
Electrical/Electronic
Electrical/Electronic
Mechanical
Mechanical
Mechanical
Mechanical
Mechanical
Mechanical
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other

Figure 3

SubCategory
Agriculture,Food,Textiles
Coating
Gas
Organic
Resins
Misc
Communications
Computer Hardware/Software
Computr Peripherals
Information Storage
Drugs
Surgey/Med Instruments
Biotechnology
Misc
Electrical Devices
Electrical Lighting
Measuring/Testing
Nuclear/X-rays
Power Systems
Semiconductor Devices
Misc
Materials Processing
Metal Working
Motors,Engines,Parts
Optics
Transportation
Misc
Agriculture,Husbandry,Food
Amusement Devices
Apparel/Textile
Earth Working/Wells
Furniture/House Fixtures
Heating
Pipes/Joints
Receptacles
Misc

Observations
58
218
87
364
324
1,115
911
842
411
787
302
292
112
101
1,258
325
507
183
1,163
1,217
354
471
329
979
713
749
692
179
119
298
130
329
151
134
186
1,164

The data set, described according to the NBER classification system.

III. A N A LY S I S
I report my statistical methods and findings in three parts. The first part
articulates a simple regression model and uses it to test whether examiner identity

31

Available online at http://www.nber.org/patents.
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influences patterns of claim language alteration. The second part uses that model
to estimate the magnitude of any examiner-specific effects. Lastly, the third part
introduces a comparable model that tests whether and to what degree technology
affects these same language considerations.
A. Examiners Matter
Define an examiner’s editorial “STYLE” to be the examiner’s proclivity to alter
patent vocabulary, expressed as a fraction where the numerator is the sum of the
number of new vocabulary words introduced in the patent claims plus the number
of existing vocabulary words omitted from the original application claims, while
the denominator is the total number of vocabulary words used in the original
application claims. Style is thus a percentage measure of vocabulary change,
where a larger score implies more significant language alterations.
My regression model can be specified as follows:
STYLE Application = STYLE Examiner + υ
where STYLEApplication is the editorial style reflected in the application/patent pair
at issue, STYLEExaminer is the idiosyncratic editorial style of the relevant examiner,
and υ stands in for error as well as unobserved inputs. Technology is not
referenced in the equation because, as explained in the previous section, I control
for technology in this part of the study by focusing on one patent class at a time.
I used the median test to determine whether examiner identity influences the
style variable.32 As those familiar with this sort of statistical work know, the
median test is not a powerful test, which is to say that it often will fail to detect
patterns even when they are in fact present. The test therefore is not useful for
ruling out the possibility of a pattern, but it is particularly useful for establishing
the existence of a pattern. The median test has another virtue as well: it makes no
assumptions about the distribution of the data under consideration. ANOVA, by
contrast, is widely used in the literature, but it is reliable only in instances where
the groups being tested are all drawn from populations that have the same
approximate variance. The Kruskal-Wallis test is another common choice, but it is
inaccurate when applied to data where a large number of the observations take on
the same value.

32

For background on the median test, see <citation>.
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Figure 4 reports the results of the median test for each of the ten technology
classes I consider. The numbers represent the confidence level for the hypothesis
that grouping by examiner is not the same as grouping randomly.
Patent Class Examiners Observations
438
11
157
365
17
451
257
11
140
439
12
250
123
16
334
327
15
244
359
12
187
361
8
144
347
10
173
701
10
202

Median Test
0.197
0.000
0.025
0.006
0.000
0.000
0.013
0.541
0.008
0.013

Figure 4 Median test results, reported by patent class.

In summary, even with a relatively insensitive test, the data regarding
language alterations suggest that examiner identity matters in five of the ten
technology categories at a confidence level greater than 0.01, and in eight of the
ten categories at a confidence level greater than 0.05. This is compelling evidence
that there are examiner-specific effects.33
B. Magnitude Estimates
To estimate the magnitude of the various examiner effects is admittedly
difficult using my data, both because there is a great deal of noise in the patent
process, and because publication of patent applications is such a new program that
at this stage I have a very limited number of observations per examiner. That said,
I report here the point estimates derived from running tobit regressions for each of
my ten technology classes. In each regression, the style of the relevant observation
was the dependent variable and the independent variables were dummy variables
standing in for the style of each examiner working in the relevant patent class.
Tobit was the appropriate choice here because, in a somewhat surprising 20% of
the observations, no changes were made to claim language during patent

33

This evidence is consistent with the results obtained by other researchers who have
looked to see whether examiners vary along dimensions other than their tendency to alter claim
language. See, e.g., Iain Cockburn, Sam Kortem & Scott Stern, Are All Patent Examiners
Equal? The Impact of Characteristics on Patent Statistics and Litigation Outcomes, in Patents
in the Knowledge-Based Economy (Cohen & Merrill, eds, 2003) at 19-53 (arguing, among
other things, that some examiners are more likely than others to have their patents invalidated
by the Federal Circuit).
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prosecution and thus the data are bunched at zero.34 Again, the point estimates are
significantly imprecise, yet they nevertheless communicate some information
about the magnitude of each examiner effect, and, perhaps more important, they
help to establish that magnitude differences across examiners are not trivial and
might indeed be quite sizeable.
Figure 5 reports the results in summary form. Specifically, for each
technology class, I include the mean style for applications in that class; the
difference between the examiner in the relevant sample who edits most and the
examiner in the relevant sample who edits least, reported as a percentage of the
mean; and the difference between the examiner who is at the 75th percentile and
the examiner who is at the 25th percentile, again reported as a percentage of the
mean.
Patent Class
438
365
257
439
123
327
359
361
347
701

Mean
0.13
0.09
0.20
0.25
0.10
0.21
0.16
0.21
0.15
0.11

High - Low
70%
185%
190%
154%
333%
166%
216%
134%
359%
299%

75th - 25th
34%
70%
50%
35%
159%
60%
66%
16%
100%
76%

Figure 5 Magnitudes of the various examiner effects.

The results obviously reveal considerable differences between examiners.
Even the conservative 75th-25th measure suggests that, on average, 66% of the
style score is determined solely by the identity of the examiner involved.35

34

Tobit is the correct choice rather than probit because observations are censored at zero,
not truncated there.
35

One concern with this statistic is that there might be an informal norm at the Patent
Office under which the least complicated applications are assigned to inexperienced examiners
and the most complicated applications are reserved for their more experienced peers. This
norm would be difficult to maintain. At first blush, it is not so easy to predict which
applications will prove difficult and which straightforward. Moreover, even if such distinctions
can be drawn, complicated applications have to be assigned to junior examiners in instances
where all the relevant senior examiners are already swamped with work, and in instances
where the junior examiner is the only examiner with the appropriate technical expertise.
Nevertheless, if it is true that inexperienced examiners are assigned a disproportionate share of
the straightforward applications, the statistic reported above would be misleading. The
problem: if inexperienced examiners routinely evaluate straightforward patent applications,
while experienced examiners routinely evaluate more complicated fare, differences between
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C. Technology Matters
To study whether technology influences the number of language alterations
made to a given application, I repeated the above analysis but grouped
applications by technology rather than examiner identity. More precisely, I used
the median test to ask whether dividing the data by technology produced a pattern
of results that was inconsistent with random grouping, and I ran tobit regressions
using dummy variables that represented not the examiners, but the technology
types. As mentioned earlier, for this part of the study and for purely cosmetic
reasons, I report the results using the more intuitive 36 technology categories
suggested by the National Bureau of Economic Research instead of the 421
categories developed by the Patent Office.

examiners might not be evidence of examiner-specific variation, but might instead simply
reflect the fact that different examiners work on applications of different complexity.
To address this worry, I repeated the median test and regressions reported thus far, but did
so using a data set that excludes any examiners working in teams. As I pointed out before,
inexperienced examiners do not work alone. Instead, for the first five or six years of
employment, an examiner must consult a more senior colleague before marking a patent
application as ready for allowance. By excluding issued patents signed by two examiners, I
therefore excluded all inexperienced examiners from the study and removed any taint that
might be due to seniority-based application allocation. The results: whereas the original data
regarding language alterations suggested that examiner identity matters in five of the ten
technology categories at a confidence level greater than 0.01, the data set that excludes
inexperienced examiners suggests that examiner identity matters in six of the ten technology
categories at a confidence level greater than 0.01. The point estimates were also comparable,
with the average style discrepancy rising from the 66% figure reported above to 75% using
data from only experienced examiners.
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Category
Chemical
Chemical
Chemical
Chemical
Chemical
Chemical
Computers/Comm
Computers/Comm
Computers/Comm
Computers/Comm
Drugs/Medical
Drugs/Medical
Drugs/Medical
Drugs/Medical
Electrical/Electronic
Electrical/Electronic
Electrical/Electronic
Electrical/Electronic
Electrical/Electronic
Electrical/Electronic
Electrical/Electronic
Mechanical
Mechanical
Mechanical
Mechanical
Mechanical
Mechanical
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other

SubCategory
Agriculture,Food,Textiles
Coating
Gas
Organic
Resins
Misc
Communications
Computer Hardware/Software
Computr Peripherals
Information Storage
Drugs
Surgey/Med Instruments
Biotechnology
Misc
Electrical Devices
Electrical Lighting
Measuring/Testing
Nuclear/X-rays
Power Systems
Semiconductor Devices
Misc
Materials Processing
Metal Working
Motors,Engines,Parts
Optics
Transportation
Misc
Agriculture,Husbandry,Food
Amusement Devices
Apparel/Textile
Earth Working/Wells
Furniture/House Fixtures
Heating
Pipes/Joints
Receptacles
Misc

Style
0.357
0.292
0.205
0.265
0.273
0.224
0.219
0.248
0.222
0.103
0.465
0.167
0.486
0.256
0.188
0.120
0.202
0.108
0.131
0.190
0.206
0.194
0.218
0.070
0.126
0.223
0.182
0.225
0.300
0.212
0.224
0.234
0.230
0.152
0.255
0.184

Figure 6 Point estimates by technology category.

The median test confirms that technology matters at a confidence level
exceeding 0.000. Figure 6 shows the associated point estimates. The difference
between the most- and least-edited technologies is nearly double the average score
for technologies taken as a whole, and the difference between the technologies at
the 75th and 25th percentiles is approximately 30% of that average style score.36
Note that these point estimates are much more reliable than the point estimates
reported with respect to examiners, because this time each is derived using a large
number of observations.
IV. D I S C U S S I O N
The empirical evidence presented in the previous section documents two basic
insights: that patent examiners differ sharply in terms of their tendency to instigate
claim language alterations; and that patterns of claim language alteration also vary
substantially from one technology to another. As outlined in the Introduction,
these findings have important implications for the rule of prosecution history

36

The difference between the most- and least-edited technologies is 0.417, while the mean
for the entire data set is 0.228. The difference between the 25th and 75th percentiles is 0.064.
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estoppel. The finding with respect to patent examiners suggests that the risks
associated with prosecution history estoppel are allocated in an arbitrary manner.
The threat of estoppel grows with the number of claim language amendments, and
the number of claim language amendments is in turn significantly influenced by
the editorial tendencies of the examiner. Meanwhile, the finding with respect to
technology suggests that, while prosecution history estoppel is framed as if it were
a rule that applies uniformly across technology categories, it is in fact a rule with
technology-specific implications.37 It creates minefields for patentees who work in
industries where language changes are common, but it is all but irrelevant where
language changes are relatively rare. In this section, I develop these concerns more
fully and integrate them into a broader discussion of both prosecution history
estoppel and the doctrine of equivalents.
A. Examiner Disparities
It is hardly surprising that patent examiners differ from one another in ways
that affect the scope and value of the patents they issue. Patent examiners are
human, after all, and thus like judges, jurors, voters, and English teachers, their
personalities and capabilities inevitably affect the decisions they make while on
the job. What is surprising is that the rule of prosecution history estoppel is
implemented in a way guaranteed to exacerbate the problem. Bluntly, the
evidentiary presumptions currently in place render estoppel, and hence patent
scope, remarkably sensitive to the happenstance of examiner identity. This is an
unanticipated cost associated with the modern estoppel rule; and my basic
argument here is that this cost must be weighed against whatever benefits the
rule—and specifically the evidentiary presumptions—otherwise make possible.
Economic-minded readers might initially reject my analysis on the ground
that, so long as the patent system is calibrated such that it offers the optimal level
of protection on average, and so long as patent applicants are in general riskneutral, examiner inconsistency is not a problem because it will not alter applicant
behavior. That is, if an applicant has a fifty percent chance of being awarded a
patent that is too broad, and a fifty percent chance of being awarded a patent that
is equally too narrow, basic economics seems to suggest that an applicant will
invest in patent-eligible research at the exact level he would under a system where
every patent came out just right. Consistency, on this argument, is irrelevant to
patent system design, and thus the economic-minded reader might be tempted to

37

This supports Professors Dan Burk and Mark Lemley in their recent argument that the
patent system has many such uneven doctrines. See Dan Burk & Mark Lemley, Policy Levers
in Patent Law, Virginia L. Rev. (forthcoming 2003).
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say that I am wrong to worry about examiner inconsistency in the context of
prosecution history estoppel.38
One obvious response is that many patent applicants are risk averse.
Technology startups, for instance, are surely constrained by the practical and
financial concerns associated with unpredictable patent rights and, indeed,
unpredictable potential patent liabilities. Moreover, the United States patent
system is explicitly designed with the small inventor in mind. The wisdom of this
emphasis is subject to challenge, but the descriptive reality is that many patent
doctrines unique to the American system—most notably, the rules that award
patent protection to the first inventor to conceive of an invention, rather than the
first inventor to file for patent protection39—are designed to favor small inventors.
In the United States patent system, then, small inventors play a substantial role,
and risk aversion has a seat at the policy table.40
Putting risk aversion to one side, there are many other reasons why the
intuitive argument fails and consistency is in fact an important objective in patent
system design. First, even if the possibility of an overly broad patent perfectly
offsets the possibility of an overly narrow patent from the perspective of a wouldbe patentee, it does not necessarily follow that the social costs also offset. Quite
the opposite, the social costs associated with overly broad patents likely
overwhelm the social benefits associated with unduly narrow ones. The details
depend on exactly what it means for a patent to be broad versus narrow; but the
intuition follows from the familiar principle that, at prices near the monopolistic
level, a marginal increase in price imposes more social harm than it yields in
patentee benefit,41 whereas, at lower prices, the ratio of patentee benefit to social
harm is typically more favorable and can even be reversed. Phrased another way,
under a variety of conditions, the increase in deadweight loss associated with

38

The discussion above brackets distributional issues as well as incentives to engage in
add-on research. Both of those are obviously very sensitive to patent scope and, hence, both
support my argument that examiner consistency does matter from a public policy perspective.
For a richer introduction to the economics of add-on innovation, see Robert Merges & Richard
Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 839 (1990); Douglas
Lichtman, Property Rights in Emerging Platform Technologies, 29 J. Legal Stud. 615 (2000).
39

See 35 U.S.C. §§102(g) & 135.

40

Of course, research is itself significantly uncertain, and thus risk-averse patent
applicants have other reasons to avoid the patent system beyond the legal uncertainty
considered here. See F.M. Scherer, The Innovation Lottery, in Expanding the Boundaries of
Intellectual Property (R. C. Dreyfuss, D. L. Zimmerman & H. First, eds. 2001).
41

For discussion and a formal model, see Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting
Patentees’ Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 985
(1999).
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raising a patent holder’s profits by $10 is larger than the reduction in deadweight
loss associated with decreasing that patent holder’s return by the same $10.
Because of that, variance that leaves patent applicants indifferent might
nevertheless be unattractive from a social welfare perspective.42
Along a similar theme, while it is easy to hypothesize a system where variance
is increased but patent applicants on expectation earn the optimal reward, in
practice such a system is almost impossible to design. The reason is edge
conditions. An applicant who under the optimal system would have been denied
patent protection will, under a high variance system, sometimes be awarded
protection. But there is no offset against which to cancel that distorted incentive,
because there is no such thing as negative patent protection. The same problem in
the reverse might be true for applicants who, under the optimum system, would
have received the broadest possible patent related to their invention. Here, there is
again no offset against which to cancel out an errant patent, this time because by
definition there can be no patent broader than the patent to which this applicant
was already entitled. As a practical matter, then, a system with variance cannot
perfectly mirror the outcomes achieved by a more consistent regime, and the result
is increased investment in inventions that would be excluded from protection
under ideal circumstances and decreased investment in inventions that would be
prized most heavily under the optimal regime.
I have focused thus far on difficulties inherent in the assumption of symmetric
error, but another concern is that applicants will alter their behavior in socially
undesirable ways even if examiner idiosyncrasies do cancel out. For instance,
applicants are more likely to delay discretionary investments associated with their
inventions in a system with high variance than they are in a more consistent
alternative. The reason is that, in a regime with high variance, delay yields
information that might in turn help the applicant to better prioritize different

42

Consider a specific example. Define demand to be linear demand of the form p=-q+1,
where p is price and q is quantity. Suppose that marginal cost is zero and that the optimal
patent would give the patent holder sufficient market power such that his price would be 0.3
and thus his producer surplus would be 0.21. If an overbroad patent lets the patent holder
charge 0.45 and thus earn a producer surplus that is 0.0375 greater, the corresponding overly
narrow patent would allow the patent holder to charge 0.2216 and thereby earn 0.0375 less. By
design, then, the patent holder would be indifferent between a patent regime that consistently
allowed him to charge 0.4, and a patent regime that half the time allowed him to charge 0.45
and half the time allowed him to charge 0.2216. But society is not indifferent. The latter
approach leads to an expected deadweight loss that is 40% greater than the deadweight loss
associated with the optimal patent. The numbers: at a price of 0.2216, the producer earns
0.1725 and imposes deadweight loss of 0.0246; at a price of 0.3, the producer earns 0.21 and
imposes a loss of 0.045; and at a price of 0.45, the producer earns 0.2475 and imposes a loss of
0.10125.
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possible investments. Concretely, an applicant who is unsure whether his claim
will cover all touch-sensitive computer screens or merely touch-sensitive
computer screens built using a particular design cannot know how best to allocate
his marketing and manufacturing resources. Such an applicant will have an
incentive to hold those resources in reserve until uncertainty is reduced, in that
way increasing the odds that any additional investments will maximize the value
of the patent as it ultimately issues.
Another undesirable behavior change is that applicants who would have
chosen to pursue patent protection under a consistent patent regime might, in light
of examiner variance, opt instead to rely on trade secrecy. Trade secrecy is a
competitor to the patent system,43 and the ideal patent system would be tailored to
ensure that appropriate inventions are directed toward the appropriate system.
Examiner variance distorts the optimal allocation by changing the patent system’s
risk/reward profile. The patent system thus must either lure marginal inventions
back by compensating in some other way—presumably at the cost of some other
social interest—or accept the fact that increased variance distorts the allocation of
inventions between these two regimes. Note that there is an even more troubling
possibility lurking here: it is possible that applicants can enter the patent system,
begin to interact with their assigned examiner, and then retreat to trade secrecy in
those instances where the examiner appears stingy. This cherry-picking would
undermine any argument that examiner inconsistencies cancel out, as generous
examiners would end up issuing many more patents than would their more finicky
peers.44
The list of problems potentially raised by examiner disparities can go on at
some length. Inconsistency might undermine confidence in the patent system as
both policymakers and the public realize that patent scope turns significantly on
the luck of examiner assignment. It might undermine the statutory presumption of

43

See William Landes & Richard Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property
Law 381-433 (2003) (emphasizing that patent law is in many ways a response to the economic
problems associated with trade secret protection).
44

On a related theme, I should point out that, in some arts, there are so few examiners
qualified to evaluate patent applications that the examiner’s identity is predictable. In those
instances, prosecution history estoppel does not increase uncertainty, but it does affect
applicant behavior in unintended ways. For instance, if the examiner most likely to evaluate
patents relating to a particular photographic process is known to require significant claim
language alterations, applicants might shy away from patenting inventions in that category,
preferring instead to rely on trade secrecy. In most instances, however, it is difficult to predict
the identity of the examiner, both because there are a large number of examiners employed at
the Patent Office, and because there is substantial employee turnover as examiners move on to
other careers in law, business, and government.
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patent validity,45 this time because courts might become less willing to defer to
what they perceive as, at best, a noisy information stream. It might also lead to
increased litigation, if (say) overly broad patents are more likely to be challenged
than are patents of appropriate scope. Any number of these many reasons combine
to suggest that examiner consistency is a problem not only for patent applicants,
but also for the patent system more generally.
The discussion above disregards the fact that, in the context of prosecution
history estoppel especially, applicants can mitigate the consequences of variance
by investing additional resources in patent prosecution. For example, an applicant
can appeal adverse examiner decisions up the Patent Office hierarchy, and an
applicant can in certain instances turn for relief to the federal courts.46 There even
exist procedures through which an applicant can ask the Patent Office to reopen an
issued patent and reconsider the language of its claims.47 Further, as a last resort,
applicants can always at a minimum carefully document the reasons for any
language changes, in that way rebutting the various evidentiary presumptions that
give estoppel its principal bite. From the applicant’s perspective, none of this
changes the basic point, however: whether it is because the costs of patent
prosecution go up, or because the risk of estoppel becomes more severe, it is still
true that, the more finicky the examiner, the lower the returns to the patent holder.
From a policy perspective, the analysis also remains largely unchanged even
as these various applicant responses are considered. For instance, in the discussion
above, I point out that, even where the possibility of an overly broad patent
perfectly offsets the possibility of an overly narrow patent from the perspective of
a would-be patentee, it does not necessarily follow that the social costs also offset.
The reason is that the increase in deadweight loss associated with overly broad
patents is likely greater than the decrease in deadweight loss associated with
unduly narrow ones. This same basic logic holds if, instead of receiving unduly
narrow patents, unlucky applicants spend more money on patent prosecution but
then end up with patents of appropriate scope. After all, under this assumption, the
patent system must still generate some number of overly broad patents to

45

See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (obligating courts to presume that issued patents are valid).

46

For an introduction to the various options, see Robert Merges & John Duffy, PATENT
LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 1153-1254 (2002). Even with these various
possibilities, note that examiners do retain considerable discretion, as this oversight is only so
fine-grained, and only certain decisions can be appealed anyway. See Thomas, supra note _, at
204-06.
47

Although the options here are limited. See Marty Adelman & Gary Francione, The
Doctrine of Equivalence in Patent Law: Questions that Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U Penn
L Rev 673, 716 (1989).
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compensate for the risk of expensive prosecution; and this time there is no
possibility of an offsetting social gain, both because no unduly narrow patents
issue, and because the extra money invested by unlucky applicants is itself
deadweight loss—which is to say that these resources could be conserved if only
examiners were more consistent.
Take stock of what all this means. Because examiners differ considerably in
terms of their tendency to require amendments to patent claim language, and
because every amendment to patent claim language carries with it some risk of
ultimately triggering prosecution history estoppel, the happenstance of examiner
assignment has serious implications for patent scope. Draw a finicky examiner,
and not only might that examiner directly press for literal claims that narrowly
describe the invention at hand, but, by virtue of estoppel, that examiner might also
indirectly constrain the protection that otherwise would be available under the
doctrine of equivalents. This is obviously troubling to the unlucky patent applicant
who is assigned a finicky examiner. My point in this section is that it is troubling
from a public policy perspective as well. The reason: applicants will adjust their
behavior in light of this random effect, in many instances choosing patterns of
investment, disclosure and prosecution that reduce social welfare as compared to
the patterns that would obtain were estoppel not an issue.
B. Technology Disparities
There are many plausible reasons why patterns of claim language alteration
might vary from one technology to another. It might be, for example, that patents
are used in different ways in different industries, and that those differences cause
applicants in some fields to edit patent language more aggressively. It might be
that more money is spent by applicants in certain industries than is spent by
applicants in other industries, a difference that again would likely be reflected in
the prosecution strategies played by the respective applicants. It might even be
that a broad claim is worth more in certain industries, a difference that might make
the relevant applicants more willing to file overly broad claims even if overly
broad claims increase the risk of narrowing amendments and hence estoppel. If
part of the explanation, however, is that language adjustments are more common
in complicated and/or rapidly evolving technologies—technologies where it is
more difficult for applicants to write appropriate claims in the first instance, and
technologies where, at the time of patent prosecution, there is more room for
reasonable disagreement between applicant and examiner—then the implication is
that estoppel threatens to repeal the doctrine of equivalents in the very cases where
that doctrine is needed most.
To see this, consider the primary policy rationales that support the use of
equivalents analysis. The first, and the one that courts most often stress, is the idea
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that patent holders should in certain situations be protected from “unscrupulous
copyists” who would otherwise undermine the value of patent protection by
exploiting literal loopholes in patent claim language.48 The classic articulation
comes from the Supreme Court in Graver Tank, where the majority opined that
the “essence of the doctrine is that one may not practice fraud on a patent” by
making “unimportant and insubstantial changes” that, “though adding nothing,
would be enough to take the copied matter outside” the scope of the literal
claims.49 Many factors determine when this rationale applies—the Court vaguely
states in Graver Tank that “equivalency must be determined against the context of
the patent, the prior art, and the particular circumstances of the case” and is not “a
prisoner of a formula”50—but a review of the cases suggests that three factors
dominate: (1) a finding of infringement by equivalents is more attractive in
instances where loopholes of the type under consideration would otherwise
substantially reduce patent value in the long run; (2) a finding of infringement by
equivalents is more attractive the more costly it would be for applicants to
anticipate and avoid such loopholes in the future; and (3) a finding of equivalents
is less attractive the less competitors had adequate notice that the patent would be
interpreted to cover the equivalent at issue.51
These factors interact in complicated ways. For instance, a variation that, at
the time of prosecution, would have been obvious to a person “skilled in the art”
might seem inappropriate for protection by equivalents on the ground that
applicants should be expected to anticipate obvious variations. However, courts
are rightly sympathetic,52 the implicit logic being that in such a case there is no
notice problem because competitors can easily predict that trivial variations will
fall within the scope of equivalents; moreover, applicants would in fact find it
expensive to anticipate and describe every petty substitution that might be made
by a strategic competitor, and the threat posed by these loopholes would indeed

48

Graver Tank, cite in note _, at 607.

49

Id. at 607-08.

50

Id. at 609.

51

As this footnote itself makes clear, eevn a calim wtih literal ipemrfetcoins can siltl be
reltaively esay to inertpret correctly.
52

See, e.g., Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 213 Ct. Cl. 395, 420 (1977)
(“equivalency is established where a person reasonably skilled in the art would have known of
the interchangeability of an ingredient not disclosed in the patent with one that was”). But see
Adelman & Francione, supra note _, at 697 (criticizing these cases on ground that patentee
should have chosen better claim language).
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significantly erode patent value.53 A helpful way to think about such a case is to
recognize that the doctrine of equivalents here serves to call off a wasteful arms
race, a race that would otherwise encourage copyists to spend excessively on
meaningless attempts to skirt literal claim language, and applicants to respond by
upping the ante with respect to their attempts to craft the perfect phrase.
Viewed in light of this policy rationale, the technology-specific implications
of prosecution history estoppel cut precisely backwards. Estoppel restricts
equivalents most severely in cases where claim language changed significantly
during the course of patent prosecution. But the factors that likely explain the high
number of language changes—the difficulty the applicant faced in crafting
appropriate claim language up front, and the room that was left for reasonable
disagreements between applicant and examiner—suggest that these are also
instances where drafting comprehensive literal claim language would have been
prohibitively expensive and instances where, even after prosecution, literal
loopholes might still pervade. This is not to say that the doctrine of equivalents
should always protect claims that fall in these categories. But if prosecution
history estoppel means that the doctrine of equivalents cannot close loopholes in
these cases, one has to wonder why patent law has a doctrine that allows for
loophole-closing at all.
The second major policy rationale that supports the use of equivalents analysis
derives from the fact that, in certain situations, there is much to be gained from
allowing a court to revisit patent scope even after a patent examiner has signed off
on the patent’s claim language. The intuition is that patent prosecution takes place
early in the development of a technology, long before relevant information is
available about how the invention will mature and what its economic implications
will be. In most cases, the patent system disregards this problem, reasoning that
the applicant himself should know the invention well enough to craft appropriate
literal claims. But, as applied to the most complicated and rapidly changing
technologies, early claim drafting can be a recipe for disaster, and thus the
doctrine of equivalents holds out the possibility that, in rare but appropriate
circumstances, courts will in essence redraw claim boundaries using information
that was not available at the time of patent prosecution.54 Doing so has a sizeable
drawback—the practice denies competitors clear notice of what is, and what is

53

Encouraging exhaustive claiming would also be counterproductive, as the resulting
claim language would either contain so much detail, or be written in such generic terms, that it
would be almost impossible to read.
54

The doctrine of equivalents allows the court to expand patent scope. The court in
addition has the power to reduce patent scope either by invalidating a claim in full, or by
narrowing its scope under the seldom-used reverse doctrine of equivalents.
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not, within the patent’s scope—but as applied to technologies where the claims
issued at the end of patent prosecution would otherwise regularly prove
inadequate, this sort of judicial intervention is a necessary evil.
Unfortunately, as it was with the loophole rationale, here again the
technology-specific implications of prosecution history estoppel work in reverse:
nearly every case where judicial intervention might plausibly be attractive is also a
case where equivalents analysis will be disproportionately limited by estoppel.
After all, the same lack of information that would make intervention attractive will
also make it more expensive for applicants to draft literal claim language up front,
and also increase the likelihood that the examiner will disagree about the
appropriate literal language and thus require that the applicant make changes
during patent prosecution. Phrased another way, the same lack of information that
would make intervention attractive during litigation also will lead to the behaviors
during patent prosecution that trigger prosecution history estoppel. Far from
reducing the uncertainty inherent in equivalents analysis—the justification
invoked by the Supreme Court in Festo, Graver Tank, and Warner-Jenkinson—
the rule of prosecution history estoppel thus threatens to emasculate the doctrine.
Finally, the third policy rationale supporting the existence of the doctrine of
equivalents is based on the somewhat related idea of self-selection. Few patents
end up being of real economic consequence, and thus in many cases the resources
invested in patent review are pure waste.55 This is one reason why the process of
patent prosecution is so minimalist. It might seem odd that patent prosecution
involves only the applicant and an assigned examiner, and that the average
prosecution consumes a mere eighteen hours of the examiner’s time;56 but the
justification is that it makes no sense to instigate a grand production every time an
inventor sees fit to file for patent protection, given that most patents spend their
term gathering dust in a drawer.57 Patents that are drawn into litigation, however,

55

It is not always true that, where a patent ends up having no economic value, the
resources invested in patent review were pure waste. For example, the process of patent
prosecution might serve to reduce uncertainty by clarifying that a given patent has only narrow
scope. The process might similarly sharpen claim language in a way that helps competitors
successfully design around the patent. My point here is only that the resources devoted to
patent evaluation can sometimes be used more efficiently if they are held in reserve until more
is known about which patents have economic significance.
56

Mark Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1495, 1496
n.3 (eighteen hours is the average total amount of “time spent reading the application, reading
the submitted prior art, searching for and reading” additional prior art, and otherwise
interacting with the applicant).
57

Lemley develops this argument at length in the article cited in note _. His argument
might understate the importance of removing uncertainty by declaring dud patents invalid
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are a special subset. They have economic consequence—why else would the
parties find it worthwhile to invest in litigation?—and it is therefore more likely
worthwhile to invest in them the resources needed for vigorous review. This is
why litigation allows parties opposed to the patent to themselves participate in the
process; and this is why, instead of working with the relatively thin factual record
typically cobbled together for patent prosecution, in litigation courts encourage the
parties to document with care evidence regarding exactly when the patentee took
each inventive step and exactly what was at each moment already known to the
prior art.
Applications that are particularly attractive for this more intensive “second
look” are applications where there is reason to doubt the quality of the work done
during patent prosecution. My argument, at this point predictable, is that many
such applications will also be applications where court discretion is sharply
limited by prosecution history estoppel. The reason, as before, is that the factors
that likely lead applicants to file claim language that is then altered during patent
prosecution are some of the very factors that also suggest a need for the more
vigorous review available through litigation. These are applications covering
particularly complicated inventions, and applications related to rapidly developing
technology categories, two categories where it is understandably difficult for
applicants to predict what their assigned examiner will approve, and two
categories where it is also obviously true that the extra firepower available in
litigation would lead to more appropriate patent scope. Thus, here again, estoppel
threatens to limit equivalents analysis in the core cases that equivalents analysis
was designed to address. To accept a legal rule that makes equivalents
disproportionately unavailable in these cases is therefore in a very real sense to
abandon the doctrine of equivalents.58
C. Reforms and Responses
Concerns about differences between examiners and across technology
categories can be addressed. For example, the evidentiary presumptions that under
current law significantly amplify the risk of estoppel could be reversed, such that

rather than allowing them to issue, but his basic point is surely right: the limited resources
spent on patent review must be allocated wisely between patent prosecution on the one hand,
and patent litigation on the other.
58

Even if I am wrong in all of the arguments put forward in this section—that is, if I am
incorrect in my explanation for why patterns of language alteration differ from one technology
to the next, or if a reader disagrees with my interpretation of the doctrine of equivalents—note
that my basic point nevertheless survives: estoppel is a rule with technology-specific
implications, and those implications have been ignored in the design and implementation of the
modern evidentiary presumptions.
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estoppel is triggered only when there is clear evidence that the applicant explicitly
waived his right to later argue that a particular product or process is an equivalent.
Similarly, while it might be expensive to do, patent examiners could be required to
document more carefully the reasons for any claim language changes, again the
purpose being to ensure that estoppel is triggered only in those rare instances
where an applicant was indeed aware of and intending to disclaim specific
coverage. These and comparable reforms would reduce the legal risk associated
with amendments to claim language, and they would thereby reduce the
importance of examiner and technology disparities.59
Admittedly, this would at the same time render prosecution history estoppel
less effective at the goal of bringing certainty to equivalents analysis. After all, the
fewer times estoppel is triggered, the fewer safe harbors it creates, and thus the
wider the scope of equivalents left intact. But that just confirms that estoppel is a
mechanism poorly suited to the task of increasing certainty. Implemented
conservatively, it will be triggered only rarely. Implemented moderately, it likely
increases overall uncertainty by forcing patentees and their rivals to predict not
only how a court will apply the doctrine of equivalents to the claims at hand, but
also whether estoppel was triggered and how broad the resulting limitations will
be. Implemented as it is today, with strong evidentiary presumptions papering
over holes in the record, the rule is dangerously sensitive to differences between
examiners and across technologies. Patent law could better improve certainty by
arbitrarily suspending the doctrine of equivalents for any patent assigned a patent
number that is evenly divisible by seven. From the perspective of patent
applicants, such a rule would be equally random; and at least the divisible-byseven rule would not disproportionately target those technologies where
equivalents analysis is needed most.
V. C O N C L U S I O N
I have focused in this Article on the specific theory that prosecution history
estoppel can be an effective mechanism by which to cabin the uncertainty created
by the doctrine of equivalents. That theory was not targeted at random. It is the
theory that the Supreme Court invoked in every case where the Court then
articulated and defended the evidentiary presumptions at issue here; and it is the
theory that pervades the several opinions issued by the Federal Circuit in the
context of the recent and on-going Festo litigation. That said, increased

59

Examiner differences could also be tackled head-on, perhaps by involving an additional
examiner in each prosecution or by making appeals within the Patent Office more routine. The
large number of patent applications filed each year, however, would likely render these reforms
prohibitively expensive.
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predictability is not the only plausible theory that justifies the rule of prosecution
history estoppel, and the arguments I have presented here have implications for
those alternative theories as well.
For example, it might be that the act of negotiating claim language with an
examiner puts an applicant in a better position to write clear, appropriately tailored
literal claims. If so, then some form of estoppel might be an appropriate response,
in essence increasing the importance of literal claim language in cases where that
language can bear the extra burden. Likewise, it might be that examiners who
aggressively influence claim language are also the most conscientious about their
work. If so, again estoppel would have policy allure, this time because it would
obligate courts to defer more heavily to conscientious examiners. It might even be
that the real motivation behind prosecution history estoppel is to encourage
applicants to submit appropriately narrow claims right from the start.60 The logic
this time is that unduly broad claims are particularly likely to be changed during
patent prosecution, and thus estoppel threatens most severely those applicants who
claim too much in their original patent applications.61
These theories have strengths and weaknesses. My contribution is simply to
emphasize that, no matter what the underlying policy motivation, an estoppel
doctrine implemented with stringent evidentiary presumptions threatens two
unintended consequences: it disproportionately limits the doctrine of equivalents
in particular technology classes, and it makes patent value more random by
linking patent scope to a personal characteristic that varies considerably from one
examiner to another. With respect to the uncertainty rationale, these costs are in
my view devastating. As applied to other rationales, these costs are factors that
must be weighed both when comparing estoppel to competing mechanisms, and
when deciding the appropriate weight and direction of any evidentiary
presumptions.

60

See Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent Administration and the Failure of
Festo, 151 U. Penn. L. Rev. 159 (2002) (developing this theory). See also John Duffy, The
Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of Patents, 2002 Sup. Ct. Rev.
273, at 319-20 (emphasizing that it has long been standard practice for applicants to submit
unduly broad claims at first and then gradually whittle those claims down during patent
prosecution).
61

There are many other plausible explanations for prosecution history estoppel. For
example, estoppel might defend the integrity of Patent Office review by ensuring that an
applicant cannot take one position while trying to convince an examiner to allow a claim, and
then adopt a conflicting position during later litigation. Estoppel also pressures applicants to
exhaust available Patent Office remedies, although query whether that is a benefit or a cost.
For discussion of these and other theories, see Thomas, cited in note _, at 204-09.
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In short, and again no matter what the underlying theory, the rule of
prosecution history estoppel must be crafted in a way that is sensitive to the
practical realities of patent prosecution. The Supreme Court said as much in
Festo;62 yet the Court went on in that case to endorse an interpretation that fails
the test. The Federal Circuit will have the opportunity to mitigate this problem as
it develops the details of the evidentiary presumptions established in WarnerJenkinson and Festo, and as it decides in the first instance the proper presumptions
to be used at other steps in estoppel analysis.63 My purpose in this Article is to
provide the Federal Circuit with the arguments and empirical evidence it needs to
engage in that process.

62

Festo VIII, cited in note _, at 738.

63

See, for example, the discussion in note _.
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